

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ALBERT GRUNEWALD,

Plaintiff,

-against-

SUFFOLK COUNTY FAMILY COURT;  
SUPPORT MAGISTRATE JOHN ERNEST  
RAMOND; THERESA HARRINGTON;  
STATE OF NEW YORK,

Defendants.

20-CV-7745 (CM)

TRANSFER ORDER

COLLEEN McMAHON, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, a citizen of Arizona, invokes the Court's federal question jurisdiction, alleging that defendants violated his rights under state and federal law during family court proceedings in Suffolk County, New York. For the following reasons, this action is transferred to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York.

**DISCUSSION**

Under the general venue provision, a civil action may be brought in:

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located; (2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred . . . ; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Under § 1391(c), a "natural person" resides in the district where the person is domiciled, and any other "entity with the capacity to sue and be sued," if a defendant, resides in any judicial district where it is subject to personal jurisdiction with respect to the civil action in question. § 1391(c)(1), (2).

Plaintiff alleges that the events giving rise to his claims arose in Suffolk County, New York, and in the states of Arizona and Florida.<sup>1</sup> Plaintiff lists addresses for Defendants in Suffolk County, New York. Because Plaintiff does not allege that Defendants reside in this District<sup>2</sup> or that a substantial part of the events or omissions underlying his claim arose in this District, venue does not appear to be proper in this District under § 1391(b)(1) or (2).

Even if venue were proper here, however, the Court may transfer claims “[f]or the convenience of the parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). “District courts have broad discretion in making determinations of convenience under Section 1404(a) and notions of convenience and fairness are considered on a case-by-case basis.” *D.H. Blair & Co. v. Gottdiener*, 462 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 2006). Moreover, courts may transfer cases on their own initiative. *See Bank of Am., N.A. v. Wilmington Trust FSB*, 943 F. Supp. 2d 417, 426-427 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“Courts have an independent institutional concern to see to it that the burdens of litigation that is unrelated to the forum that a party chooses are not imposed unreasonably on jurors and judges who have enough to do in determining cases that are appropriately before them. The power of district courts to transfer cases under Section 1404(a) *sua sponte* therefore is well established.” (quoting *Cento v. Pearl Arts & Craft Supply Inc.*, No. 03-CV-2424, 2003 WL 1960595, at \*1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 24, 2003)); *see also Lead Indus. Ass ’n.*

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<sup>1</sup> To the extent Plaintiff asserts claims arising from events occurring in the states of Arizona or Florida, venue ma be improper in both this District and the Eastern District of New York.

<sup>2</sup> Plaintiff names as a Defendant the State of New York, which arguably resides in the Southern District of New York as well as the Eastern District of New York. This Defendant, however, is immune from this suit: “as a general rule, state governments may not be sued in federal court unless they have waived their Eleventh Amendment immunity, or unless Congress has abrogated the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity . . . .” *Gollomp v. Spitzer*, 568 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2009). New York has not waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity to suit in federal court, and Congress did not abrogate the states’ immunity in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983. *See Trotman v. Palisades Interstate Park Comm ’n*, 557 F.2d 35, 40 (2d Cir. 1977).

*Inc. v. OSHA.*, 610 F.2d 70, 79 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that “broad language of 28 U.S.C.

§ 1404(a) would seem to permit a court to order transfer *sua sponte*”).

In determining whether transfer is appropriate, courts consider the following factors:

(1) the convenience of witnesses; (2) the convenience of the parties; (3) the locus of operative facts; (4) the availability of process to compel the attendance of the unwilling witnesses; (5) the location of relevant documents and the relative ease of access to sources of proof; (6) the relative means of the parties; (7) the forum’s familiarity with the governing law; (8) the weight accorded to the plaintiff’s choice of forum; (9) trial efficiency; and (10) the interest of justice, based on the totality of circumstances. *Keitt v. N.Y. City*, 882 F. Supp. 2d 412, 459-60 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); *see also N.Y. Marine and Gen. Ins. Co. v. LaFarge No. Am., Inc.*, 599 F.3d 102, 112 (2d Cir. 2010) (setting forth similar factors). A plaintiff’s choice of forum is accorded less deference where plaintiff does not reside in the chosen forum and the operative events did not occur there. *See Iragorri v. United Tech. Corp.*, 274 F.3d 65, 72 (2d Cir. 2001).

Under § 1404(a), transfer appears to be appropriate in this case. The underlying events occurred in Suffolk County, New York, where all Defendants appear to reside. Suffolk County falls within the Eastern District of New York. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 112(c). Venue is therefore proper in the Eastern District of New York. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b). Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court concludes that it is in the interest of justice to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).

## **CONCLUSION**

The Clerk of Court is directed to transfer this action to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York. The Clerk of Court is further directed to transmit a copy of

this order to Plaintiff.<sup>3</sup> Whether Plaintiff should be permitted to proceed further without prepayment of fees is a determination to be made by the transferee court. A summons shall not issue from this Court. This order closes this case.

The Court certifies, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith, and therefore *in forma pauperis* status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. *See Coppedge v. United States*, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).

SO ORDERED.

Dated: October 16, 2020  
New York, New York



COLLEEN McMAHON  
Chief United States District Judge

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<sup>3</sup> Plaintiff has consented to electronic service of Court documents. (ECF No. 3.)